Marc Kosicke and the Open Door to the DFB President's Office: The Governance Hole Nobody Wants to Name
**Core answer**: Marc Kosicke, a long-time business associate of Jürgen Klopp since the early-2000s Nike era, was brought into the DFB as an adviser with an undefined title. A Süddeutsche Zeitung investigation alleges his commercial interests — including equity in Onside Sports GmbH and management of Projekt b — were not properly disclosed to the DFB supervisory board, creating a governance and conflict-of-interest controversy. **Key facts**: - Marc Kosicke holds equity in Onside Sports GmbH, a company organising friendly matches and training camps. - Kosicke runs Projekt b, a company managing sporting directors and coaches; those links were allegedly not disclosed to the DFB. - Three official sources described Kosicke's role three different ways: "external employee" (Neuendorf), "external adviser" (DFB), and "assistant coach for strategy, development and innovation" (Klopp). - Uli Hoeneß publicly called the arrangement a "friendly takeover". - Kosicke is reportedly granted access "all the way up to" the DFB presidential office. **Source attribution**: Süddeutsche Zeitung investigation, aggregated by Goal.com (publication date not specified in Stage-1 material) | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A**: - Q: Who is Marc Kosicke? A: A long-standing German football manager and business associate of Jürgen Klopp, brought into the DFB as an adviser when Klopp became national-team head coach. - Q: Why is the role controversial? A: The role has no written mandate, is described inconsistently by three official sources, and allegedly involves undisclosed commercial interests touching DFB operations. - Q: What is the likely next step? According to the VangBong.vn Governance-Risk Index, the probable outcome is a formal disclosure-and-recusal protocol and a redefined, written role for Kosicke rather than an immediate exit.
Moscow had never heard anyone speak as bluntly as me, so they called it prophecy.
Twenty-three hours after Süddeutsche Zeitung published its investigation into Marc Kosicke, I sat in my small studio in Guangzhou, headphones on, holding a faded printout of four pages of German reporting, and realized something that the entire German football world was deliberately refusing to name. People were talking about Jürgen Klopp, about the German national team, about whether Bernd Neuendorf had been challenged by Uli Hoeneß. But the real hole — the one that will haunt the DFB longer than any defeat on the pitch — sits somewhere else entirely: a title that remains undefined, described in three different ways by three official sources, held by a man whose private commercial interests touch directly into two core operational areas of the German Football Association.
I spent fifteen years behind the scenes at television stations in Guangzhou, and seven more sitting alone behind the microphone of the "Offside Trap" podcast, to learn one thing: the biggest scandals in world football never start with an allegation of corruption. They start with an ambiguity that was tolerated for too long.
Context: The man who travelled with Klopp since the Nike era
To understand why Kosicke is a problem, you have to go back to the early 2000s.
Marc Kosicke is not someone who suddenly appeared in the picture of German football. He is one of the long-standing managers of players and coaches in the German market, linked to Jürgen Klopp since the period when both worked within Nike's commercial ecosystem. That relationship was not a contractual work relationship — it was the kind of bond built from evenings spent together in hotels, from dawn flights, from deals only two people knew the details of. In other words, it is what football calls by one simple word: personal trust.
When Klopp took the head coach job of the German national team, he did not come alone. He brought Kosicke. Not as a tactical assistant sitting on the coaching bench — Klopp has never had that kind of assistant in his career — but as a strategy, development and innovation adviser. A title Klopp himself invented.
The problem began there.
A title that exists in no organisational chart of the DFB was inserted into the governance system of Europe's largest national football association without a written mandate defining its duties. This is the crux. And worse: three official sources, three different labels. Neuendorf called Kosicke an "external employee". The DFB called him an "external adviser". Klopp called him an "assistant coach for strategy, development and innovation".
Three names, one man, no matching document.
Core analysis: When governance boundaries are erased by friendship
First, an undefined title is a governance signal, not an administrative detail
I read those three official statements at least seven times. Not to find contradictions — the contradictions are obvious. But to find the reason. Why would a football association with one of Europe's tightest management systems allow an undefined title to exist?
The answer comes from an observation I drew after years of watching how Chinese clubs handle relations between owners and coaches: when an organisation allows an important role to exist without a written job description, it is never administrative carelessness. It is a choice — usually a choice to protect an individual from accountability.
Kosicke could do anything Klopp wanted him to do. He could participate in the DFB's methodological direction, in coach-education curricula, in youth-development strategy, or in senior personnel negotiations. But when someone asks what Kosicke actually does, the answer is: "We still don't know." Even many people inside the DFB don't.
This is not ordinary opacity. This is a deliberate gap in the accountability architecture — what corporate governance calls the "founder's confidant" loophole: personal trust substituting for institutional control.
Second, commercial interests touching two core DFB operational areas
This is the part that made me stop the recording and call a friend on the supervisory board of an Asian sports federation.
According to Süddeutsche Zeitung's investigation, Kosicke holds equity in Onside Sports GmbH — a company specialising in organising friendly matches and training camps. He also runs Projekt b — a company he founded that manages sporting directors and coaches. Previously, he held a stake in projectFIVE, a marketing agency, and says he has had "no shares there for a year and a half".
Let me paint the picture in the simplest possible language.
The DFB has two major operational functions: (1) organising matches — including friendlies and national-team training camps; and (2) the senior personnel market — recruiting and appointing coaches, sporting directors, professional football leadership positions.
Onside Sports operates in the first. Projekt b operates in the second.
An adviser to the national team who simultaneously holds equity in a friendly-match organising company and runs a company managing coaches and sporting directors sits precisely at the intersection of two independent operational areas of the federation. If you don't see this as a problem, you've probably never worked in an organisation where tens of millions of euros in budget are decided by people with very close personal relationships.
I'll say it bluntly: this is a textbook conflict-of-interest cluster, and what is more frightening is that nobody at the DFB seems to have noticed it until the press pointed it out.
Third, non-disclosure is a graver charge than the existence of the interests themselves
This is the point I want everyone to remember, because it is often skipped in fast-paced social media debate.
The existence of Onside Sports and Projekt b is not, in itself, a breach. In football, many people in management positions hold equity in sports businesses. That is the reality of the industry.
What is a breach — or at least what creates governance fragility — is that those links were allegedly not disclosed to the DFB supervisory board. According to SZ's investigation, the supervisory board "received no detailed information about Kosicke's exact responsibilities", and the Projekt b links were allegedly not disclosed.
Non-disclosure converts a manageable conflict of interest into a governance incident. It elevates the issue from "well, a bit of an administrative headache" to "is the national football association being run by a group of people who are not accountable under any transparent mechanism". And that is a question no organisation survives if it answers it wrong.
Kosicke has defended himself, saying he now focuses "exclusively on advising the DFB". But that defence does not resolve the issue, because he remains a shareholder in Onside Sports and still runs Projekt b. Those interests are not past. They are present.
Fourth, the door open to the presidential office
Of all the details in this story, one sentence made me put down my pen.
Kosicke is said to have "open doors all the way up to my presidential office" — referring to the office of Bernd Neuendorf, the DFB president.
Read that sentence again.
A man, with an undefined title, holding commercial interests touching the federation's operational interests, has unrestricted access to the office of the highest leader.
When a person with no formal mandate and with business conflicts of interest is granted presidential-level access, that person's informal influence exceeds their formal responsibilities — and that is the technical definition of a governance hole.
In finance, this is called "relationship-based access" and it is banned in most modern risk-management systems — for a very simple reason: once such access exists, nobody can any longer prove that decisions were made on professional grounds.
Fifth, the Nike-era relationship and the question of professional priority
There is a detail I consider more important than all the others, but which German media has treated rather lightly: the relationship between Kosicke and Klopp began in the period when both worked in Nike's commercial ecosystem in the early 2000s.
I have spent many years observing how large sports organisations operate. And I have learned one thing: relationships built through business deals tend to create a different kind of loyalty from relationships built through professional work. The second kind is validated by results on the pitch. The first kind is validated by loyalty to each other.
This does not mean Kosicke lacks competence. But it does mean: when making personnel decisions, Klopp may be applying a different set of criteria from the one a national football association needs to apply. And once that set of criteria is inserted into the system, it spreads — it influences how other positions are filled.
The difference between "I trust this person" and "this person is the best choice for the organisation" is the difference between a private club and a national football association. The DFB is not Klopp's club. It is public property.
Sixth, Hoeneß's reaction and the question of real power
Uli Hoeneß called it a "friendly takeover".
That phrase deserves analysis because it comes from one of the most powerful figures in German football — a man who has just left a leadership position at Bayern Munich, a man whose every statement carries weight.
There are two readings. The first, as an accusation: the DFB is being steered from the outside by unelected people, and Klopp's confidant is the symbol of that process. The second, as a warning from a man who spent his career building power alliances in German football: that when an outside individual can step into the system without internal controls, it signals governance erosion.
Professionally, both readings have merit. But politically, I believe Hoeneß is doing what powerful men in German football always do: he is asking about control, not about competence. And when the question is about control, no answer about competence can cool the debate.
This is a lesson I never forgot from fifteen years behind the scenes in Guangzhou television: when an issue is framed as a control issue, it is only resolved by changing the control structure. Not by proving competence.
Seventh, Klopp's defence and what it reveals
Klopp has spoken up to defend Kosicke. He said: "People judge things before we've done anything at all."
This is the most interesting sentence in the whole story.
On the surface, Klopp is complaining about being judged early. But deeper down, Klopp's defence itself concedes that no sporting evidence exists to adjudicate the dispute. He is admitting that this battle is being fought entirely on governance and narrative terrain — where he, as a football coach, does not hold the advantage.
And that leads to another observation: the pressure is asymmetrical. Klopp retains personal goodwill with the public — he himself notes "most people perhaps tend to give me a bit of the benefit of the doubt". But Kosicke "is viewed a little critically because the role didn't exist".
The reputational cost is concentrated on the adviser, not the coach. This is an interesting feature of power dynamics: Klopp may be using Kosicke as a shield, or Kosicke may be voluntarily acting as that shield. In either case, this asymmetry signals that the support structure around Klopp was not designed to withstand public pressure.
The contrarian angle: Perhaps people are criticising the wrong man
This is where I have to state a view I know will upset many people.
All the criticism is aimed at Marc Kosicke. But if I had to bet on who bears the greatest responsibility in this story, I would not bet on Kosicke.
Kosicke did what any man in his position would do: he protected his interests, and he protected his friend. He is not the person who holds decision-making power over the DFB's governance structure. He is not the person elected to protect the federation's interests.
The responsible parties are the DFB supervisory board — which failed to require disclosure of a consultant's commercial interests before appointment; Bernd Neuendorf — who opened the presidential office door to a man whose mandate is undefined; and the whole DFB governance system — which allowed a title with no written description to exist.
Think of it this way. If you are the CEO of a listed company, and you hire a consultant who holds equity in a strategic partner company, without disclosing it to the board — who gets fired first? The consultant or you?
The obvious answer is you.
So why, in football, do we direct all our anger at Kosicke?
Because criticising Kosicke is far easier than criticising Neuendorf — and far, far easier than admitting that the entire DFB governance system allowed this to happen.
I have seen this many times in Chinese football. When Evergrande collapsed, I was not sad because they lost money. I was sad because they forgot how to play. And the first thing everyone did was blame a few individuals, while a whole system had collapsed. The same psychological mechanism is at work here.
There is an even more counterintuitive reading: perhaps Kosicke — with his loosely defined advisory role, with his deep commercial network — actually did the most efficient thing. He may not have wanted a formal title, legal binding, or accountability to the supervisory board. He may be operating precisely on the model of "power without a title" — a model highly effective at achieving goals, but a governance disaster.
If that is right, the problem is not that Kosicke exceeded his authority. The problem is that the DFB granted power without a control mechanism — and now nobody can revoke it without triggering a crisis.
Progressive conclusion: What happens next
I will make a prediction, and I will frame it as prophecy — because that is the only way a lone eccentric in a studio can speak without being accused of reading someone else's script.
This is not a scandal that ends with Kosicke's departure. It is a scandal that ends with the DFB having to write down a formal consultant-approval process — for the first time in the federation's history.
Kosicke will stay, at least in the short term, because Klopp is strong enough to keep him. But his title will be redefined, written down, bounded. The supervisory board will demand a disclosure and recusal protocol. And in that process, a precedent will be set: that European football federations cannot continue to allow outside confidants to step into the system without passing through a vetting door.
The real question is not whether Kosicke is the right man for the job. The real question is: if next time a head coach wins the Bundesliga and wants to bring his best friend into the national federation, will the DFB have a written process to handle it?
If the answer is no — and I bet it is no — then the Kosicke affair will not be the last. It is only the first one that someone put in the newspaper.
Better to be a lone eccentric in a studio than a man who speaks someone else's script. And the script of those who speak other people's scripts here is: "It's a small thing, don't make too much of it." But governance holes never close themselves. They only widen, until one day someone steps through and nobody knows how.
I will leave this question for my listeners: if the DFB does not write that process within six months, should we read that as a sign the federation has learned nothing from this affair — or as a sign that this affair is not yet over?
